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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Aaron J. Campbell *
Kathleen B. Martin **
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past year, the Supreme Court of Virginia and the
Court of Appeals of Virginia have continued to develop and refine
the case law regarding a defendant's confrontation rights, the
withdrawal of guilty pleas, and appellate procedure. The courts
have also addressed important issues concerning search and sei-
zure, firearm offenses, and sentencing. This article summarizes
the holdings of these and other significant cases in criminal law
and procedure. The article also briefly addresses recent legisla-
tion pertaining to criminal law.
II. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Trial
1. Arrest on Outdated Capias
Virginia Code section 19.2-76.1 requires the Commonwealth's
Attorney to petition the circuit court for the destruction of unexe-
cuted felony warrants that have been retained for seven years
from the date of issuance and "misdemeanor arrest warrants,
summonses and capiases and other criminal processes ... that
have not been executed within three years from the date of issu-
ance."' In Boone v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Vir-
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General, Commonwealth of Virginia; J.D., 2009, University of Richmond School of Law;
B.A., 2002, Concord University.
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1. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-76.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
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ginia upheld the defendant's arrest on a capias for a probation vi-
olation issued four years earlier.2 The court assumed without de-
ciding that the capias should have been destroyed under Virginia
Code section 19.2-76.1 because it was issued more than three
years before, but since it had not been ordered destroyed, it re-
mained valid.' The court concluded the statute prohibits arrests
under warrants ordered destroyed by the circuit court but pro-
vides no remedy for a warrant "older than the specified age which
has not been ordered destroyed by the circuit court."'
2. Attorney Conflict of Interest
The law is well established that a criminal defendant has the
right to effective assistance of counsel at trial.' Where the de-
fendant's attorney has "an actual conflict of interest [that] ad-
versely affect[s]" his performance, a defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment rights are violated.' However, the conflict must be more
than "a mere theoretical division of loyalties."'
In Spence v. Commonwealth, the defendant argued the trial
court should have granted his request to relieve the entire Public
Defender's Office from handling his case after Spence threatened
the senior assistant public defender originally assigned to repre-
sent him.' The Court of Appeals of Virginia disagreed, finding
Spence raised nothing more than "a mere theoretical concern that
another attorney's performance might be affected" by knowledge
of the threat.'
The court stated it did not need to determine whether the con-
flict between Spence and his previous attorney should have been
imputed to the entire office under Rule 1.10 of the Virginia Rules
of Professional Conduct.o A violation of an ethical rule does not
2. 60 Va. App. 419, 420-22, 728 S.E.2d 517, 518-19 (2012).
3. Id. at 423, 728 S.E.2d at 519-20.
4. Id. at 423-24, 728 S.E.2d at 520.
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)
("[Tihe Court has recognized that 'the right to counsel is the right to the effective assis-
tance of counsel."' (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970))).
6. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980).
7. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171 (2002).
8. 60 Va. App. 355, 359, 727 S.E.2d 786, 788 (2012).
9. Id. at 370-71, 727 S.E.2d at 793.
10. Id. at 371, 727 S.E.2d at 793. Rule 1.10 provides that no attorney in a law firm
"shall knowingly represent a client" if another lawyer in the firm would be prohibited from
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by itself require reversal of a criminal conviction." The court of
appeals determined an ethical conflict of interest should not be
confused with a conflict under the Sixth Amendment." Lastly, the
court declined to address whether Virginia Code section 19.2-
163.4 was violated because Spence's threat had not been directed
to the entire office. 3
3. Venue
In Bay v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia ad-
dressed the issue of venue for cases involving terrorism.14 The de-
fendant in Bay was charged with several acts of terrorism after
authorities thwarted his attempt to attack a Virginia Beach high
school with various explosives and pipe bombs.' He made a pre-
trial motion for a change of venue on the basis that all residents
of Virginia Beach were per se disqualified to sit as jurors on his
case because they were all potential victims of his crimes." The
trial court found the motion to be premature until voir dire was
conducted."
Bay argued on appeal that the trial court erred in declining to
change venue." The court of appeals held that status as a city res-
ident did not necessarily mean every resident could not be fair
and impartial." Because venue for a crime of terrorism is set "in
the county or city where such crime is alleged to have occurred or
where any act in furtherance of a[ . . . prohibited [act] was com-
mitted," the court of appeals concluded that disqualifying per se
all local jurors would adversely affect the efficient administration
of justice, as it would require a change in venue for every trial in-
volving charges of terrorism.20 Insuring an impartial jury is re-
doing so. VA. RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (2004).
11. See Spence, 60 Va. App. at 371, 727 S.E.2d at 794.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 372 n.9, 727 S.E.2d at 794 n.9. The court of appeals reasoned that because
"[t]he threat Spence made to his original attorney was personal to that attorney and was
not directed to other attorneys in the Public Defender's Office" it was an imputed-rather
than a direct-conflict of interest. Id.
14. 60 Va. App. 520, 525, 729 S.E.2d 768, 770 (2012).
15. Id. at 526, 729 S.E.2d at 770.
16. Id. at 529-31, 729 S.E.2d at 772-73.
17. Id. at 529, 729 S.E.2d at 772.
18. Id. at 528, 729 S.E.2d at 771.
19. Id. at 533, 729 S.E.2d at 774.
20. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-46.8 (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
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served for voir dire, which the trial court properly conducted in
Bay's case.21 Thus, the court of appeals concluded that denying
22
the motion to change venue was not error.
4. Confrontation Rights
In Robertson v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virgin-
ia, sitting en banc, held the Sixth Amendment right to confront
witnesses did not require that "every single person involved in
the joint preparation of an exhibit" be available for cross-
examination at trial, or that "everyone whose testimony might be
relevant" be called as a witness.23 In Robertson, the defendant at-
tempted to steal numerous items from a store before being appre-
hended by the manager.24 Afterwards, the manager assisted an-
other employee in scanning each item in order to determine the
value of the recovered items.2 5 The employee recorded the price of
each item on a piece of paper, which was admitted into evidence
at the defendant's trial for felony shoplifting.2 6 Only the store
manager testified at trial.27
On appeal, Robertson argued the employee who actually pre-
pared the list should have testified instead of the manager.28 The
court of appeals determined that because the employee and the
manager had collaborated in preparing the list and the manager
was subject to cross-examination at trial, the employee's testimo-
ny was not necessary.2 Distinguishing Bullcoming v. New Mexi-
co30 on its facts, the court determined no confrontation violation
had occurred." Any deficiencies in the manager's testimony went
to its weight, but did not bar its admission into evidence.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 533-34, 729 S.E.2d at 774.
23. 61 Va. App. 554, 559, 563, 738 S.E.2d 531, 533, 535 (2013).
24. Id. at 557, 738 S.E.2d at 532-33.
25. Id., 738 S.E.2d at 533.
26. Id. at 557-58, 738 S.E.2d at 533.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 558-59, 738 S.E.2d at 533.
29. Id. at 565, 738 S.E.2d at 636-37.
30. 564 U.S. -, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). In Bullcoming, the prosecution called as a
witness a laboratory analyst familiar with testing procedures but who had not been in-
volved in the analysis of evidence introduced at trial. Id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2709.
31. Robertson, 61 Va. App. at 563-65, 738 S.E.2d at 535-37.
32. Id. at 565, 738 S.E.2d at 537.
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The Sixth Amendment confrontation right applies only at trial,
however." In parole and probation revocation proceedings, a de-
fendant's right to confront witnesses is limited to his due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment." In Henderson v.
Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed the
standard to be applied in admitting hearsay evidence at a revoca-
tion hearing." The Commonwealth presented testimony of a po-
lice detective who investigated an attempted robbery and a home
invasion robbery in which Henderson had been involved, but was
not prosecuted. 36 The detective testified that she contacted the
victims in both cases, interviewed Henderson, and monitored tel-
ephone calls Henderson and his two co-defendants in the home
invasion case made from jail after their arrests." The detective's
testimony established that telephone calls made by Henderson
intimidated the victims." The trial court overruled Henderson's
objections to this testimony on hearsay and confrontation
grounds, but stated no reasons for its ruling, and revoked Hen-
derson's probation."
Testimonial hearsay is admissible "only when the hearing of-
ficer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation."40
The Supreme Court of Virginia first observed that while the trial
court should have stated for the record the specific grounds it re-
lied upon for overruling Henderson's objections, the failure to do
so had not been preserved for appeal." The court independently
reviewed the record to determine whether sufficient credible evi-
dence supported a finding of "good cause for not allowing confron-
tation."42 The court considered both the "reliability test," which al-
lows testimonial hearsay to be admitted in revocation proceedings
if it "possesses substantial guarantees of trustworthiness," and
the "balancing test," which weighs the defendant's interests in
33. See Henderson v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 318, 325, 736 S.E.2d 901, 905 (2013).
34. Id. at 325-26, 736 S.E.2d at 905.
35. Id. at 321-22, 736 S.E.2d at 903.
36. Id. at 322-23, 736 S.E.2d at 903.
37. Id. at 322-24, 736 S.E.2d at 903-04.
38. Id. at 324, 736 SE.2d at 904. The Commonwealth entered a nolle prosequi in the
home invasion robbery case because the victim refused to testify. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 326, 736 S.E.2d at 905 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489
(1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
41. Id. at 326-27, 736 S.E.2d at 906.
42. Id. at 327, 736 S.E.2d at 906 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489
(1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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cross-examining his accusers against the prosecution's interests
in denying confrontation. 43 The court stated the tests were not
mutually exclusive and either could be applied depending upon
the circumstances.4 The court concluded the reliability test was
satisfied because the detective's hearsay testimony was "circum-
stantially corroborated by evidence eminating from [other]
sources," and statements contained in the telephone calls were ei-
ther not hearsay or came within its well-recognized exceptions."5
The court also determined the balancing test was satisfied based
upon evidence that Henderson intimidated the witnesses.' The
court thus held that the evidence presented at the revocation
hearing, taken as a whole, provided "good cause" for denying
Henderson his Fourteenth Amendment confrontation rights.
The Court of Appeals of Virginia declined to consider Hender-
son's balancing test in Blunt v. Commonwealth, a case involving
the use of hearsay evidence at sentencing.48 In Blunt, the court
determined that Henderson applied only to revocation proceed-
ings, instead holding that Moses v. Commonwealth controlled."
At Blunt's sentencing hearing on charges of possessing cocaine
and driving as a habitual offender, the Commonwealth presented
evidence that he had engaged in another drug transaction with a
confidential informant following his conviction on the charges for
which he was being sentenced."0 The defendant objected on hear-
say grounds because the informant was not in court and the po-
lice officer who testified about the drug sale had not seen it
firsthand, but acquired second-hand knowledge of the sale after
speaking with the informant and watching a video of the sale."
The court of appeals concluded the officer's testimony in Blunt
was sufficiently reliable to be admissible.2
43. Id. at 327-28, 736 S.E.2d at 906.
44. Id. at 328, 736 S.E.2d at 906.
45. Id. at 330-31, 736 S.E.2d at 908.
46. Id. at 331, 736 S.E.2d at 908.
47. Id.
48. 62 Va. App. 1, 9-10, 741 S.E.2d 56, 60 (2013).
49. Id. at 3, 9, 741 S.E.2d at 57, 60 (citing Henderson, 285 Va. at 321, 736 S.E.2d at
903; Moses v. Commonwealth. 27 Va. App. 293, 498 S.E.2d 451 (1998)).
50. Id. at 3-4, 741 S.E.2d at 57.
51. Id. at 4, 7, 741 S.E.2d at 57-59.
52. Id. at 13, 741 S.E.2d at 62.
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5. Hearsay
In Godoy v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
held that records generated solely by computer fall outside the
hearsay rule and are admissible if reliable." In Godoy, the Com-
monwealth introduced the defendant's cell phone records to re-
fute the defendant's claim that he engaged in consensual sex with
the victim." A telephone company representative testified he was
the custodian of the records, but no human person had been in-
volved in creating them." The trial court overruled the defend-
ant's objection that the Commonwealth had not established that
the records came within the business records exception to the
hearsay rule." The court of appeals held that hearsay principles
did not apply to records "generated without human input" and
the admissibility of the records depended upon their reliability."
Finding the records to be sufficiently reliable, the court concluded
that they were properly admitted into evidence."
6. Expert Testimony
Recently, several cases concerning the use of expert testimony
have made their way to the Court of Appeals of Virginia. In Bur-
nette v. Commonwealth, the defendant was convicted of felony
child abuse following the death of her eight-month-old daughter
from severe head trauma." Burnette's theory of defense was that
her boyfriend injured the child while she was absent from the
home.60 On appeal, Burnette argued that the trial court should
have allowed her attorney to cross-examine an expert witness
about specific scientific literature that profiled an abusive head
trauma perpetrator as a white male, the first person to call 911,
and the last person with the victim-all characteristics that fit
her boyfriend." The court of appeals held the trial court properly
disallowed this line of questioning because both pediatricians
53. 62 Va. App. 113, 122, 742 S.E.2d 407, 412 (2013).
54. Id. at 117-18, 122-23, 742 S.E.2d at 409-10, 412.
55. Id. at 117, 742 S.E.2d at 409-10.
56. Id. at 118, 742 S.E.2d at 410.
57. Id. at 122, 742 S.E.2d at 412.
58. Id.
59. 60 Va. App. 462, 466-68, 729 S.E.2d 740, 742, 751 (2012).
60. Id. at 467, 469, 729 S.E.2d at 742-43.
61. Id. at 482, 729 S.E.2d at 749.
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were experts only in pediatrics, not head trauma perpetrators,
and thus lacked 'sufficient knowledge, skill, or experience to
render [them] competent"' on the issue.62
In Earnest v. Commonwealth, the defendant was convicted of
murdering his estranged wife, who died from a gunshot wound to
the head.6 ' A typewritten note found next to her body contained
two latent fingerprints, which were identified as the defendant's,
but there were no fingerprints of the victim.6 4 The defendant prof-
fered a law school evidence professor to testify about academic
evaluations of various studies on fingerprint analysis." While the
proffered witness was not a fingerprint examiner, she frequently
published articles on the history and use of fingerprint identifica-
tion." If permitted to testify, she would have said there was no
statistical or clinical basis for claiming a partial latent print can
be matched to a known print using the methods described by the
Commonwealth's expert witnesses. The trial court refused to al-
low this testimony and the defendant appealed."
The court of appeals held that the proffered testimony would
have been hearsay and would not have refuted the conclusions
reached by the Commonwealth's expert witness." The court ob-
served that Virginia Code section 8.01-401.1-"which permits an
expert to base his opinion on facts made known or perceived by
him at or before trial, whether admissible in themselves or not,
provided they are facts of a type normally relied on by other ex-
perts in the field"-is limited to civil cases and has not been ex-
panded to criminal prosecutions.70
In Justiss v. Commonwealth, the defendant was charged with
entering a bank armed with a deadly weapon with the intent to
commit larceny." During trial, the prosecution called a police de-
62. Id. at 483-84, 729 S.E.2d at 749-50 (quoting Mohajer v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.
App. 312, 320, 579 S.E.2d 359, 363 (2003)).
63. 61 Va. App. 223, 224-25, 734 S.E.2d 680, 681 (2012).
64. Id. at 225, 734 S.E.2d at 681.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 225-26, 734 S.E.2d at 681-82.
67. Id. at 226, 734 S.E.2d at 682.
68. Id. at 226-27, 734 S.E.2d at 682.
69. Id. at 228-29, 734 S.E.2d at 683.
70. Id. at 229, 734 S.E.2d at 683 (quoting Simpson v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 557,
566, 318 S.E.2d 386, 391 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
71. 61 Va. App. 261, 265, 734 S.E.2d 699, 701 (2012).
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tective to testify as an expert in firearms.7 2 When asked whether
the BB gun carried by the defendant was "a deadly weapon," the
court sustained an objection made by the defense, but allowed the
detective to testify that the gun had "the capacity to cause serious
bodily injury or death." On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia held the detective should not have been allowed to testify as
a firearms expert because a BB gun is not a firearm, but found
the error to be harmless given that the witness demonstrated suf-
ficient knowledge of BB guns to have qualified him as an expert
on that specific subject.7 ' Despite this finding, the case was ulti-
mately reversed and remanded because the detective's testimony
that the weapon had the capacity to cause serious bodily injury or
death elicited an impermissible opinion on the ultimate issue in
the case, which invaded the province of the jury."
7. Proof of Multiple Convictions
In a prosecution for possession of a firearm by a person previ-
ously convicted of a violent felony, in violation of Virginia Code
section 18.2-308.2(A), the Supreme Court of Virginia held in
Boone v. Commonwealth that the Commonwealth was not limited
to proving only one prior violent felony. 76 At Boone's jury trial, the
Commonwealth offered evidence of Boone's five prior convic-
tions-one for robbery and four for burglary-each of which quali-
fied as a violent felony. Boone objected, contending the statutory
language limited the proof to only one prior conviction and that
admitting more than one was cumulative and prejudicial.
The supreme court concluded that while the article "a" in Vir-
ginia Code section 18.2-308.2(A) requires proof of one violent fel-
ony, it does not limit the evidence the Commonwealth may use as
proof, as a jury might not be satisfied with the evidence upon
which the Commonwealth relied." Additionally, one or more of
72. Id. at 267, 734 S.E.2d at 702.
73. Id. at 269-70, 734 S.E.2d at 703.
74. Id. at 271-72, 734 S.E.2d at 704.
75. Id. at 275, 734 S.E.2d at 706.
76. 285 Va. 597, 599, 603, 740 S.E.2d 11, 12, 14 (2013).
77. Id. at 599, 740 S.E.2d at 12.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 601, 740 S.E.2d at 13; see Pittman v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 33, 35-36,
434 S.E.2d 694, 696 (1993) (finding that where proof of one or more prior convictions is
necessary, "the Commonwealth [is not obliged to have faith that the jury would be satis-
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the convictions used as evidence might be vacated later in an ap-
pellate or collateral proceeding, which would then affect "the in-
tegrity of the conviction being sought."o The court noted, though,
that the Commonwealth did not have "unfettered license to admit
every relevant conviction of a serial criminal," as the trial court
maintains discretion to exclude repetitious and cumulative evi-
dence."
8. Withdrawal of Guilty Plea
The Court of Appeals of Virginia has continued to define the
circumstances under which defendants may or may not withdraw
their guilty pleas. In Branch v. Commonwealth, the defendant en-
tered an Alford plea after being charged with the rape of a men-
tally incapacitated adult." Under the terms of his plea agree-
ment, Branch's active sentence was not to exceed fifteen years of
incarceration." Although Branch told the trial court during the
plea colloquy that it was in his "best interests" to plead guilty, he
moved to withdraw the plea before he was sentenced." During a
hearing on this motion, Branch testified that he had a defense to
the charge and that his trial attorneys told him he would get a
forty-year sentence if he did not take the plea." The trial court
denied the motion, stating Branch "took a look at what the conse-
quences might be after he pled guilty and had buyer's remorse."
fied with any particular one or more of the items of proof," and is "entitled to utilize its
entire arsenal").
80. Boone, 285 Va. at 601, 740 S.E.2d at 13; see, e.g., Conley v. Commonwealth, 284
Va. 691, 692-94, 733 S.E.2d 927, 928-29 (2012) (invalidating a defendant's third-offense
driving under the influence (DUI) conviction because a previously pending habeas corpus
petition resulted in the dismissal of his second DUI conviction); Rushing v. Common-
wealth, 284 Va. 270, 279-81, 726 S.E.2d 333, 338-39 (2012) (dismissing a defendant's con-
viction after the appellate court held evidence had been improperly admitted at trial and
remaining evidence in the record was insufficient to sustain conviction).
81. Boone, 285 Va. at 602, 740 S.E.2d at 13.
82. 60 Va. App. 540, 542-43, 729 S.E.2d 777, 778-79 (2012). In entering an Alford
plea, a defendant maintains his innocence, but acknowledges the Commonwealth's evi-
dence is sufficient to convict him and that pleading guilty is in his best interest. North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970); see United States v. Alston, 611 F.3d 219, 223
(4th Cir. 2010) (explaining what an Alford plea is and under what circumstances a de-
fendant would take an Alford plea). An Alford plea has the same effect as a guilty plea.
Alford, 400 U.S. at 37.
83. Branch, 60 Va. App. at 542-43, 729 S.E.2d at 778-79 (2012).
84. Id. at 543-44, 729 S.E.2d at 779 (internal quotation marks omitted).
85. Id. at 544, 729 S.E.2d at 779.
86. Id.
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The court of appeals reiterated the two-part test to be applied
when the withdrawal motion is made before sentencing: the mo-
tion is made in good faith, and the proffered defense is reasona-
ble, rather than dilatory or formal." In affirming the judgment
below, the court concluded the trial court did not err in finding
that Branch failed to act in good faith and found it unnecessary to
address whether he presented a reasonable defense in support of
the motion."
In Booker v. Commonwealth, another case in which the defend-
ant moved to withdraw his guilty plea before he was sentenced,
the Court of Appeals of Virginia rejected the defendant's claim
that he had been under duress when he entered his plea and had
a reasonable defense because the evidence against him was cir-
cumstantial." As part of a plea agreement, the Commonwealth
agreed to reduce Booker's drug distribution charge from a third
offense to a first offense and nolle prosequi two firearm offenses. 0
The court of appeals concluded the record did not show Booker
entered his plea unadvisedly or under duress, reasoning that
counsel's advice was an appropriate resolution of the case, spar-
ing Booker a lengthy mandatory minimum sentence.9'
The court of appeals also determined Booker's proffered de-
fense was "merely formal" in that it lacked substance. 92 Whether
a defense is adequate is fact specific." Booker's defense was not
supported by any facts other than that the drugs found by police
were not on his person and the apartment where they were found
had been leased by another person; however, Booker admitted
staying at the apartment and investigators later recovered his
DNA from a gun seized in the bedroom.94 Neither the fact that the
evidence of guilt was circumstantial nor the "bare possibility" a
87. Id. at 546, 729 S.E.2d at 780 (citing Bottoms v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 23, 32-33,
704 S.E.2d 406, 412 (2011); Justus v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 143, 153, 645 S.E.2d 284,
288 (2007); Parris v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 321, 324-25, 52 S.E.2d 872, 874 (1949)).
88. Id. at 549, 729 S.E.2d at 782.
89. 61 Va. App. 323, 335-37, 734 S.E.2d 729, 735-36 (2012).
90. Id. at 327, 734 S.E.2d at 731.
91. Id. at 333, 336-37, 734 S.E.2d at 734-36.
92. Id. at 334, 734 S.E.2d at 734 (internal quotation marks omitted).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 328, 335, 734 S.E.2d at 731, 735.
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juror or jury would decide to acquit Booker were valid grounds for
allowing Booker to withdraw his plea.95
When a defendant moves to withdraw his guilty plea after sen-
tencing, however, the manifest injustice standard, set forth in
Virginia Code section 19.2-296, applies, as the Court of Appeals of
Virginia held in Howell v. Commonwealth.9 6 Howell, who was
convicted of grand larceny, asserted that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying the motion to withdraw his Alford plea be-
cause he had an affirmative defense and he was not mentally sta-
ble when he entered the plea."
The court of appeals rejected Howell's first assertion, holding
that the existence of an affirmative defense only applied prior to
sentencing and that a post-sentencing motion to withdraw was
governed by the "more stringent manifest injustice standard.""
The court of appeals further held that the record, including the
extensive original plea colloquy and testimony provided by How-
ell and his trial attorney at the hearing on the motion to with-
draw, did not support Howell's claim of mental instability.99 Fi-
nally, the court noted the Commonwealth would have been
prejudiced if Howell had been allowed to withdraw his plea be-
cause a material witness would not have been available to testify
at a new trial.'o Finding Howell did not establish the requisite
manifest injustice, the court of appeals affirmed the denial of
Howell's motion to withdraw his guilty plea."o'
In Pritchett v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
addressed withdrawal of a plea made pursuant to Supreme Court
of Virginia Rule 3A:8(c)(1)(B).10 ' The defendant was charged with
95. Id. at 336-37, 734 S.E.2d at 735.
96. 60 Va. App. 737, 745-46, 732 S.E.2d 722, 726 (2012). Section § 19.2-296 provides
in pertinent part that the trial court may allow a criminal defendant to withdraw his
guilty plea within twenty-one days after entry of a final order "to correct manifest injus-
tice." VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-296 (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2013). See Johnson v. Anis,
284 Va. 462, 465-66, 731 S.E.2d 914, 915-16 (2012) (holding that where a habeas corpus
petitioner alleges his trial counsel was ineffective in seeking withdrawal of his guilty plea,
the correct standard to apply is "manifest injustice" under section 19.1-296, rather than
the more lenient standard set forth in Justus v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 143, 153, 645
S.E.2d 284, 288 (2007), which applies only before the sentence has been imposed).
97. Howell, 60 Va. App. at 747-48, 732 S.E.2d at 727.
98. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
99. Id. at 748-49, 732 S.E.2d at 727-28.
100. Id. at 749, 732 S.E.2d at 728.
101. Id.
102. 61 Va. App. 777, 780, 739 S.E.2d 922, 924 (2013); see VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:8(c) (Repl.
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statutory rape, forcible sodomy, and aggravated sexual battery
against a minor child; if convicted, he faced multiple life sentenc-
es plus twenty years in prison. 03 He accepted the Common-
wealth's offer to recommend an eight-year sentence if he pled
guilty to the offenses.104 The plea agreement provided that the
recommendation was not binding on the trial court and that, if
the court did not accept it, the defendant had no right to with-
draw his guilty plea."o' During the plea colloquy, the trial court
advised the defendant it could impose a greater sentence.106 After
hearing a summary of the evidence, the court informed Pritchett
his crimes warranted a more severe sentence.' 7 Four months lat-
er, Pritchett moved to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting he had
entered his plea inadvisedly and had a reasonable defense that
the victim was not a credible witness.08
The court of appeals determined that because the defendant's
plea was entered under Rule 3A:8(c)(1)(B), the statements he
made during the colloquy were factors the trial court could con-
sider in determining whether the plea had been entered inadvis-
edly.o' Thus, considering the totality of the record, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea."0
B. Sentencing
1. Concurrent Mandatory Minimum
In Brown v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that a trial court has discretion to sentence a defendant con-
victed on three charges of use or display of a firearm in the com-
Vol. 2013) (allowing the Commonwealth and the defendant to enter into a plea agreement,
following which, the attorney for the Commonwealth may make a recommendation for a
particular sentence, but such recommendation is not binding on the court).
103. Pritchett, 61 Va. App. at 780-81, 739 S.E.2d at 924.
104. Id. at 780, 739 S.E.2d at 924.
105. Id. at 781-82, 739 S.E.2d at 924.
106. Id. at 782-83, 739 S.E.2d at 925.
107. Id. at 783, 739 S.E.2d at 925.
108. Id. at 780, 784, 739 S.E.2d at 924, 925-26.
109. Id. at 791-92, 739 S.E.2d at 929; cf. Justus v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 143, 154,
645 S.E.2d 284, 289 (2007) (holding that in determining whether a defendant should be
allowed to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing pursuant to Virginia Code section
19.2-296, admissions made by the defendant during plea colloquy are not relevant factors).
110. Pritchett, 61 Va. App. at 793, 739 S.E.2d at 930.
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mission of a felony to concurrent mandatory minimum sentenc-
es."' The court noted that although Virginia Code section 18.2-
53.1 provides that the prescribed mandatory minimum punish-
ment for the offense of use or display of a firearm in the commis-
sion of a felony is "separate and apart from, and ... made to run
consecutively with, any punishment received for the commission
of the primary felony," the statute "does not specifically prohibit
multiple sentences for use or display of a firearm from being run
concurrently with each other.""' The supreme court further de-
termined that nothing in the language of Virginia Code section
18.2-12.1, which defines "mandatory minimum" punishment, pre-
cluded imposing concurrent sentences.1 13
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Jefferson, the Court of Appeals
of Virginia held the mandatory minimum sentences imposed for
the defendant's six convictions for production of child pornogra-
phy, in violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-374.1(C)(1), could
run concurrently.114 The court concluded the plain language of
sections 18.2-12.1 and 18.2-374.1(C)(1) did not require that the
mandatory minimum sentences be served consecutively, as the
General Assembly, if it had so intended, could have explicitly
provided that, as it had in other criminal statutes."
2. Exceeding Statutory Maximum
In Gordon v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
made clear that when a trial court imposes a sentence exceeding
the statutory maximum, the proper remedy on appeal is to re-
mand the case for resentencing.11 6 The court rejected the defend-
ant's contention that he was entitled to a new trial, and also
found unpersuasive the Commonwealth's argument that the ap-
pellate court could void the excess sentence under the theory that
the trial court had intended to impose the maximum sentence al-
111. 284 Va. 538, 541, 545, 733 S.E.2d 638, 639, 641 (2012). The supreme court's hold-
ing expressly overruled a portion of the decision rendered in Bullock v. Commonwealth, 48
Va. App. 359, 631 S.E.2d 334 (2006). Brown, 284 Va. at 545, 733 S.E.2d at 641-42.
112. Id. at 543, 733 S.E.2d at 640.
113. Id. at 543-44, 733 S.E.2d at 640-41.
114. 60 Va. App. 749, 753, 759, 732 S.E.2d 728, 730, 733 (2012).
115. Id. at 757-59, 732 S.E.2d at 732-33.
116. 61 Va. App. 682, 686, 690, 739 S.E.2d 276, 278, 280 (2013); see Rawls v. Common-
wealth, 278 Va. 213, 221, 683 S.E.2d 544, 549 (2009) (stating a sentence in violation of the
prescribed statutory range is void ab initio).
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lowed for the offense, but had been mistaken in what that sen-
tence was." 7 As the trial court was not required to impose the
maximum sentence, the appellate court could not speculate as to
what sentence the trial court intended."8
3. Deferred Disposition
In Kelley v. Stamos, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that
although a Chief Deputy Commonwealth's Attorney had standing
to file a mandamus petition in circuit court to compel a general
district court judge to sentence an individual on a charge of driv-
ing while intoxicated ("DWI"), the relief requested was not avail-
able."' The defendant in the underlying criminal case, whom the
supreme court held was not a necessary party to the appeal, pled
guilty in 2009 to driving while intoxicated.'2 0 The general district
court judge continued the case until August 2, 2011, when he
found the defendant guilty of reckless driving."'
The supreme court stated the record did not show the judge
had accepted a guilty plea to the DWI charge and thus he re-
tained authority to amend the warrant."' The 2011 order was not
void ab initio because the judge had the power to render his
judgment.12' However, the order became final twenty-one days af-
ter the district court issued it and could not be modified later be-
cause the court no longer had jurisdiction over the case."4 The su-
preme court further held that mandamus is a prospective remedy
and cannot be used "to undo an act already done."15
117. Gordon, 61 Va. App. at 686-88, 739 S.E.2d at 278-79. The trial court sentenced
the defendant to ten years in prison for unlawful wounding, but the statutory maximum is
five years. Id. at 686, 739 S.E.2d at 278.
118. Id. at 689-90, 739 S.E.2d at 279-80. The court distinguished Hines v. Common-
wealth, 59 Va. App. 567, 721 S.E.2d 792 (2012), which held no new sentencing hearing was
necessary where the only punishment provided was a mandatory sentence. Gordon, 61 Va.
App. at 688-89, 739 S.E.2d at 279.
119. 285 Va. 68, 71-72, 80, 737 S.E.2d 218, 219-20, 224 (2013).
120. Id. at 71, 79, 737 S.E.2d at 219, 224.
121. Id. at 71, 737 S.E.2d at 219.
122. Id. at 79, 737 S.E.2d at 223-24.
123. Id. at 77-78, 737 S.E.2d at 223.
124. Id. at 79, 737 S.E.2d at 224.
125. Id. (quoting In re Commonwealth, 278 Va. 1, 9, 677 S.E.2d 236, 239 (2009)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
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4. Expungement
A person charged with committing a crime may later have the
charge expunged from the police and court records if he is "ac-
quitted, . . . [a] nolle prosequi is taken or the charge is otherwise
dismissed."126 In Dressner v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court
of Virginia held that a charge for possession of marijuana, which
the Commonwealth amended to reckless driving prior to a hear-
ing in general district court, was "otherwise dismissed" for pur-
poses of expungement."' Relying on Necaise v. Commonwealth,"'
the circuit court denied the expungement petition on the basis
that it would "distort" the record by also expunging the record of
the reckless driving conviction.12 The supreme court disagreed,
stating that distortion of the record "is not a statutory basis that
makes a petitioner ineligible to seek expungement of records."'
The court further distinguished Necaise, noting that the defend-
ant pled guilty to charges that were lesser-included offenses of
the original charges.13 ' Consequently, the charges of which Ne-
caise was convicted came within the felony charges for which he
was arrested, and therefore he was not an "innocent citizen" enti-
tled to expungement.13 Dressner, however, was convicted of a
"completely separate and unrelated charge," and thus was inno-
cent of the possession charge and eligible for expungement. "
C. Appeal
1. Decision by Equally Divided Appellate Court
In Conley v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that the Court of Appeals of Virginia, sitting en banc, could
not reverse a three-judge panel decision of that court by an equal-
126. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-392.2 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
127. 285 Va. 1, 3-4, 736 S.E.2d 735, 735-36 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
128. 281 Va. 666, 669, 708 S.E.2d 864, 866 (2011).
129. Dressner, 285 Va. at 4, 736 S.E.2d at 736 (internal quotation marks omitted).
130. Id. at 7, 736 S.E.2d at 738 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-392.2(A) (Cum. Supp.
2013)).
131. Id. at 5-6, 736 S.E.2d at 737.
132. Id. at 6, 736 S.E.2d at 737 (quoting Necaise, 281 Va. at 670, 708 S.E.2d at 866)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
133. Id. at 6-7, 736 S.E.2d at 737-38.
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ly divided vote.' The three-judge panel, with one judge dissent-
ing, granted Conley's petition for a writ of actual innocence, and
the court of appeals then granted the Commonwealth's petition
for en banc review.13 5 Upon rehearing, five judges of the court of
appeals voted to grant the writ and five voted to refuse it.'36 The
court then entered an order dismissing the writ without any fur-
ther opinion. 7 Citing Virginia Code section 17.1-402(E), the su-
preme court held that in all cases decided by the court of appeals
en banc, "the concurrence of at least a majority of the judges sit-
ting" is required to reverse a judgment.'8 The court concluded the
en banc decision was of no effect and reinstated the panel deci-
sion.'39
2. Notice of Appeal
In Evans v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
dismissed the defendant's appeal because his notice of appeal did
not sufficiently identify the conviction being appealed.' Evans
was indicted separately for felony failure to appear and perjury,
which were unrelated crimes that occurred on different dates. 4 1
The offenses were consolidated for trial but retained separate
case numbers.'42 Evans intended to appeal the perjury conviction,
but the notice of appeal referenced only the failure to appear con-
viction and contained no information regarding the perjury
case."' The court of appeals held a procedural defect in the notice
was not necessarily a fatal error and could be waived, but the no-
tice must "adequately identif[y] the case to be appealed."14 4 The
court concluded the error in Evans's notice was a substantive de-
134. 284 Va. 691, 693-94, 733 S.E.2d 927, 928-29 (2012) (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-
402(E) (Repl. Vol. 2010 & Cum. Supp. 2013)).
135. Id. at 693, 733 S.E.2d at 928.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 694, 733 S.E.2d at 928 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-402(E) (Repl. Vol.
2010 & Cum. Supp. 2013)).
139. Id., 733 S.E.2d at 929.
140. 61 Va. App. 339, 345, 735 S.E.2d 252, 255 (2012).
141. Id. at 341, 735 S.E.2d at 253.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 345, 735 S.E.2d at 254-55 (alteration in original) (quoting Roberson v.
Commonwealth, 279 Va. 396, 407, 689 S.E.2d 706, 712-13 (2010)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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fect that deprived the court of active jurisdiction over the ap-
peal.4 5
3. Virginia Supreme Court Rule 5A:12
Rule 5A:12(c)(1) requires that a petition for appeal contain
'Assignments of Error' th[at] . . . list, clearly and concisely ...
the specific errors in the rulings below upon which the party in-
tends to rely."'" In addition, each assignment of error must in-
clude an "exact reference to the pages of the transcript, written
statement of facts, or record where the alleged error has been
preserved."'4 The rule's purpose is to give the appellate court no-
tice that the party has adequately preserved the alleged error."'
Rule 5A:12(c)(1)(ii) further provides that the petition shall be
dismissed if the assignments of error are "insufficient or other-
wise fail to comply with the [rule's] requirements."
In cases addressing Rule 5A:12(c)(1), the Court of Appeals of
Virginia, sitting en banc, declined to find that automatic dismis-
sal was the appropriate remedy for failure to comply with the
rule.6 o In Brooks v. Commonwealth, the court determined the
plain text of Rule 5A:12(c)(1) did not require dismissal because
the language regarding dismissal for noncompliance applied only
to assignments of error and not to referencing where the error
was preserved at trial."' The court further stated automatic dis-
missal would unfairly harm litigants and disrupt "the timely, effi-
cient adjudication of justice." 2
Accordingly, in Chatman v. Commonwealth, the court of ap-
peals allowed Chatman to amend his petition for appeal, even
145. Id., 735 S.E.2d at 255.
146. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:12(c)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2013).
147. Id.
148. See Brooks v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 576, 580-81, 739 S.E.2d 224, 226
(2013).
149. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:12(c)(1)(ii) (Repl. Vol. 2013).
150. Brooks, 61 Va. App. at 583, 739 S.E.2d at 227.
151. See id. at 583-84, 739 S.E.2d at 227-28. The court of appeals dismissed Brooks'
appeal, however, because he failed to correct the defect despite being given several oppor-
tunities to do so. Id. at 586, 739 S.E.2d at 229. He also did not move to amend his petition.
Id. Brooks' first petition had no references to the record, and his second petition referenced
the entire transcript, including many pages that were irrelevant to the issues presented.
Id. at 582, 586, 739 S.E.2d at 227, 229.
152. Id. at 583, 739 S.E.2d at 227.
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though the deadline for filing had passed."' The court stated that
"[n]either Code § 17.1-408 nor Rule 5A:12(a) specifies that the pe-
tition for appeal must be free of all defects in order to be timely
filed."'" The court further opined that neither the rule nor the
statute precluded it from allowing an appellant to correct his de-
fective petition by designating where in the record the alleged er-
ror was preserved."' The court held Davis v. Commonwealth was
not controlling because Davis concerned a defective assignment of
error, not the separate requirement to identify portions of the
record."' The court thus held it was not deprived of "active juris-
diction" over the appeal and affirmed Chatman's convictions for
abduction and aggravated malicious wounding."'
In Whitt v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia al-
lowed the appellant to amend his assignment of error to comply
with Rule 5A:12(c)(1)(ii) because the amendment did not broaden
the scope of the original assignment of error, was consistent with
the arguments appellant made at trial, and did not prejudice the
Commonwealth.' The court of appeals held that its authority de-
rived from the common law allowed it to consider amendments to
timely filed, but defective, pleadings."' The court distinguished
Davis on the ground that Davis did not hold an appellate court
had no remedy but to dismiss a defective petition, and the case
had not addressed whether a court had authority to permit an
amendment to an assignment of error because Davis had not
moved to amend.6 0
153. 61 Va. App. 618, 628-29, 739 S.E.2d 245, 250 (2013). Chatman's initial petition
contained no references to the record; he did not comply with the clerk's request to correct-
ly amend the petition, but he did comply with the court's order to do so. Id. at 624-25, 739
S.E.2d at 248.
154. Id. at 627, 739 S.E.2d at 249.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 627-28, 739 S.E.2d at 249 (citing Davis v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. 339, 717
S.E.2d 796 (2011) (per curiam)).
157. Id. at 628, 631, 739 S.E.2d at 250-51.
158. 61 Va. App. 637, 659, 739 S.E.2d 254, 265 (2013). But see Coleman v. Common-
wealth, 60 Va. App. 618, 621, 731 S.E.2d 22, 23 (2012) (following Davis v. Commonwealth,
282 Va. 339, 717 S.E.2d 796 (2011) and dismissing an appeal in a panel decision because
the defendant's assignment of error did not challenge the trial court's actual ruling).
159. Whitt, 61 Va. App. at 647-48, 739 S.E.2d at 259.
160. Id. at 652-53, 739 S.E.2d at 261-62.
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4. Virginia Supreme Court Rule 5A:20
Rule 5A:20(e) states that an appellant's opening brief must
contain "argument (including principles of law and authorities)
relating to each assignment of error.""' In Mitchell v. Common-
wealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia held the defendant, who
had been convicted of using a firearm in the commission of rob-
bery, waived appellate review of his challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence because he failed to cite sufficient legal authority in
his brief to support his argument.'6 2 The defendant's two-page ar-
gument cited only two authorities-a case stating the standard of
review and the statute pertaining to the offense at issue-and
failed to cite or discuss any of the several cases relevant to his ar-
gument, which "[e]ven the most cursory research" would have
identified."' Moreover, defense counsel waived oral argument,
"precluding an opportunity ... to supplement the glaring defi-
ciencies of the brief.""' The court noted that although failing to
comply with Rule 5A:20(e) is not jurisdictional, the absence of any
pertinent authority in Mitchell's case was so significant, the court
was "compelled" to find that Mitchell waived his right to appel-
late review and to affirm his conviction. '65
Rule 5A:20(e) also provides that if the assignment of error was
not preserved in the trial court, the brief "shall state why the
good cause and/or ends of justice exceptions to Rule 5A:18 are ap-
plicable."'6 6 In Stokes v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of
Virginia refused to consider the defendant's argument that the
ends of justice exception should be applied to his due process
claim because the argument was presented for the first time at
oral argument.'6 7 Stokes was mistakenly transferred from the lo-
cal jail to the Department of Corrections before the trial court
ruled on Stokes's motion to modify his sentence pursuant to Vir-
ginia Code section 19.2-303.168 On appeal, Stokes argued for the
161. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:20(e) (Repl. Vol. 2013).
162. 60 Va. App. 349, 351, 354-55, 727 S.E.2d 783, 784, 786 (2012).
163. Id. at 353-54, 727 S.E.2d at 785.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 354-55, 727 S.E.2d at 785-86 (citing Jay v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 510,
520, 659 S.E.2d 311, 317 (2008); Fadness v. Fadness, 52 Va. App. 833, 851, 667 S.E.2d
857, 866 (2008)).
166. R. 5A:20(e) (Repl. Vol. 2013).
167. 61 Va. App. 388, 397, 736 S.E.2d 330, 335 (2013).
168. Id. at 391-92, 736 S.E.2d at 332. Stokes' transfer to the Department of Correc-
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first time his due process rights had been violated.169 The court of
appeals held Stokes's argument was waived because he could
have made it in his opening brief or reply brief, pursuant to Rule
5A:20(e), but had not.o
III. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Constitutional Issues
1. Search and Seizure
A fresh issue in criminal law is whether warrantless use of
global positioning system ("GPS") tracking devices by law en-
forcement violates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable search and seizures. In Foltz v. Commonwealth, po-
lice identified Foltz as a registered sex offender who lived and
worked in the vicinity of a series of sexual assaults."' After dis-
covering that Foltz's prior crimes were similar to the assaults un-
der investigation, police attached a GPS tracking device to the
bumper of Foltz's work van while it was parked on a public street
outside his house.'72 Days later, data retrieved from the GPS
showed the van in close proximity to the location of a recent as-
sault. 73
The next day, police began shadowing Foltz.'74 Not long into
their surveillance, officers saw Foltz get out of his vehicle and fol-
low a woman walking down a sidewalk.'7 5 Foltz grabbed the wom-
an and quickly pulled her under a nearby tree.7 7 The officers res-
cued the woman and arrested Foltz.'7 7 Foltz was convicted of
abduction with intent to defile and commission of a subsequent
violent sexual assault.17 ' At trial, the victim testified that once
tions contravened an order of the trial court to keep him in the Norfolk City jail until the
court ruled on his motion. Id. at 391, 736 S.E.2d at 332.
169. Id. at 396, 736 S.E.2d at 334-35.
170. Id. at 397, 736 S.E.2d at 335.
171. 284 Va. 467, 469, 732 S.E.2d 4, 5-6 (2012).
172. Id.





178. Id. at 470-71, 732 S.E.2d at 6-7 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-48 (Repl. Vol. 2009
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Foltz grabbed her, he covered her mouth with one of his hands
and tried to unbutton her pants with his other hand."'
Prior to trial and on appeal, Foltz argued that the police-
without first obtaining a search warrant-unlawfully installed
the GPS device on his vehicle in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment."' As a consequence of this illegal search, Foltz argued that
the officers' testimony was inadmissible."' As Foltz's appeal was
pending, the Supreme Court of the United States decided United
States v. Jones, holding that "the government's placement of a
GPS tracking device on the bumper of a vehicle and its use of that
device to monitor the vehicle's movements is a 'classic trespassory
search' which, in the absence of a valid search warrant, is a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment."1 82 Applying Jones, the Supreme
Court of Virginia agreed that the warrantless use of the GPS in
Foltz's case constituted an unconstitutional search.' 3 The su-
preme court found, however, that the admission of the officers'
testimony was harmless error since their testimony regarding the
assault was cumulative of the victim's own testimony.
In Washington v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia considered whether exigent circumstances justified an of-
ficer's warrantless entry into the defendant's home."' During the
investigation of a residential break-in, officers noticed a single set
of footprints with a distinct checkered pattern in the fresh
snow."' The officers then followed the footprints across the street
to the front door of a mobile home.'"' After knocking on the trail-
er's front door and finding it to be ajar, officers feared the trailer
was being burglarized and immediately announced their pres-
& Cum. Supp. 2013); id. § 18.2-67.5:3 (Repl. Vol. 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2013)).
179. Id. at 471, 732 S.E.2d at 6.
180. Id. at 470-72, 732 S.E.2d at 6-7.
181. Id. at 470, 732 S.E.2d at 6.
182. Id. at 472, 732 S.E.2d at 7 (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S __ , 132 S.
Ct. 945, 954 (2012)).
183. Id. The 2012 Virginia General Assembly codified a procedure by which law en-
forcement officers may obtain a search warrant to install a tracking device on a suspect's
vehicle. See Act of Apr. 5, 2012, ch. 636, 2012 Va. Acts 1338 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
19.2-56.2 (Cum. Supp. 2013)); Act of Apr. 6, 2012, ch. 679, 2012 Va. Acts 1399 (codified at
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-56.2 (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
184. Foltz, 284 Va. at 473, 732 S.E.2d at 8.
185. 60 Va. App. 427, 434, 437, 728 S.E.2d 521, 525-26 (2012).
186. Id. at 432-33, 728 S.E.2d at 524.
187. Id. at 433, 728 S.E.2d at 524.
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ence."' Hearing no answer, the officers entered the trailer and
saw a stolen toolbox and shoes matching the footprints in the
snow."' The officers then obtained and executed a search war-
rant, finding several stolen items from the burglarized home.'
Following the search, Washington arrived and acknowledged he
lived alone at the residence.'
On appeal, Washington argued that the initial entry into his
trailer violated the Fourth Amendment.'" Ordinarily, police can-
not enter a home without first securing a search warrant."' How-
ever, when coupled with a showing of probable cause, there are
"several exigencies that may justify a warrantless search of a
home."'94 One of these exigencies is triggered when officers "rea-
sonably believe that the premises have recently been or are being
burglarized.""' In Washington, the court of appeals held that the
information known by the officers supported a finding of probable
cause and exigent circumstances.19 Among the circumstances
supporting the officers' suspicions of a burglary in progress were
the recent burglary across the street, the fresh footprints in the
snow leading from the burglarized home to the trailer, the open
trailer door, and the possibility that the reason no one responded
to the officers' announcement was because the burglar had inca-
pacitated its residents.' Thus, the court found that the initial
warrantless entry did not violate the Fourth Amendment.'
In contrast to Washington, the Court of Appeals of Virginia




191. Id. Washington also implicated himself in the burglary when, without knowing
the reason for the officers' presence, he volunteered that he "hadn't done anything. He
hadn't broken into anybody's house." Id. at 434, 728 S.E.2d at 524 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
192. Id. at 434, 728 S.E.2d at 525.
193. Id. at 436, 728 S.E.2d at 526 (citing Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. ,' 131 S. Ct.
1849, 1856 (2011)) (stating the general rule that "searches and seizures inside a home
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable").
194. Id. at 437, 728 S.E.2d at 526 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S _, 131 S.
Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
195. Id. (quoting 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 6.6(b), at 470-72 (4th ed.
2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
196. Id. at 438, 728 S.E.2d at 526.
197. Id., 728 S.E.2d at 526-27.
198. Id. at 439, 728 S.E.2d at 527.
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search of a home in Ross v. Commonwealth.' Ross filed a petition
in a juvenile and domestic relations court seeking additional vis-
itation with his daughter.2 0 0 That court ordered the local Depart-
ment of Social Services ("DSS") "to conduct a 'home study' of Ross
and to report its findings to the court."201 The court's order "au-
thorized an unannounced visit, but did not authorize the DSS so-
cial worker to enter Ross's residence against his will."202
On the day of the visit, the social worker spoke with Ross in the
front yard because Ross would not allow the social worker in his
home."' During this time, "[a] police officer, viewing the situation
from an unmarked police car, saw Ross 'getting upset and some-
what agitated' and 'flaring his arms around."'2 04 The officer called
for backup, which arrived at the front of the home shortly there-
after and caused Ross to immediately return to his residence.2 00
Officers pursued Ross, and "with weapons drawn, entered Ross's
residence and placed him in handcuffs."0 ' During a protective
sweep of the home, officers discovered marijuana and various
firearms in plain view.07
The court of appeals addressed whether an exception to the
warrant requirement existed in Ross's case.20 The Common-
wealth argued for the application of the emergency exception,
based upon "the danger to anybody in the house once [the social
worker] entered."2 09 The court rejected this argument, finding
nothing in the record to support the assumption that the social
worker would have- entered the house and triggered an emergen-
cy situation.21 The court also rejected the Commonwealth's asser-
tion of the community-caretaker doctrine, based upon "the offic-
ers' duty to protect both the social worker and any of Ross's
199. 61 Va. App. 752, 764, 739 S.E.2d 910, 916 (2013).
200. Id. at 757, 739 S.E.2d at 912.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id., 739 S.E.2d at 913.




208. Id. at 759, 739 S.E.2d at 913.
209. Id. at 762, 739 S.E.2d at 915 (alteration in ori
omitted).
210. Id. at 762-63, 739 S.E.2d at 915.
mitted).
ginal) (internal quotation marks
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children within the residence."2 1  The court found no evidence that
the social worker needed protection given that he remained out-
side the home. 212 Additionally, there was no evidence that Ross's
children were in the residence, nor that Ross intended to harm
them.213 Finding that the entry into Ross's home violated the
Fourth Amendment, the court reversed the trial court's denial of
the motion to suppress and remanded to determine the scope of a
suppression order.'
In another ruling addressing the community-caretaker doc-
trine, the Court of Appeals of Virginia in Knight v. Common-
wealth found a Fourth Amendment violation in the warrantless
search of a closed container."' The item in question was a black
backpack Knight carried when he entered a mall security office.216
Knight told the security officer on duty that he had gotten into a
fight with his girlfriend, and that the security guard needed to
accompany him to the parking lot to help calm her down.2" When
the two reached the mall exit, they saw that police had arrived.218
Leaving Knight with the police, the security guard returned to
the security office where she noticed Knight's backpack beside the
door.219 After locking the office door, the security guard walked
back to the parking lot and told one of the police officers about the
backpack.220 The officer went to the security office, picked up the
backpack, opened it, and saw a firearm.22 1
In denying Knight's motion to suppress, the trial court found
that the officer's warrantless search of the backpack was a "valid
exercise of his 'community caretaker' function."22 2 The court of ap-
peals reversed, explaining that "[t]he community caretaker excep-
tion requires that an officer have an objectively reasonable belief
that his conduct in searching a closed container, such as the
backpack here, is necessary to provide aid or to protect members
211. Id. at 763, 739 S.E.2d at 915-16.
212. Id. at 764, 739 S.E.2d at 916.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 764 n.7, 739 S.E.2d at 916 n.7.
215. 61 Va. App. 297, 302, 734 S.E.2d 716, 718-19 (2012).
216. Id. at 302-03, 734 S.E.2d at 719.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 303, 734 S.E.2d at 719.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 304, 734 S.E.2d at 719.
222. Id. at 304-05, 734 S.E.2d at 720.
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of the public from physical harm."2 " The court provided three cir-
cumstances where the community-caretaker exception would jus-
tify an officer's search: "(1) the protection of the owner's property
while it remained in police custody; (2) the protection of police
against claims or disputes concerning lost or stolen property; or
(3) protection of the public and the police from physical danger."22 4
The court found no evidence to suggest that a search would have
protected the backpack or its contents from theft or damage, pro-
tected against claims of stolen property, or protected the police or
public from danger.2 5 The court therefore held that the trial court
erred in denying Knight's motion to suppress the handgun found
in his backpack.226
2. Stop and Frisk
In Otey v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia ad-
dressed whether a partially burned out brake light provided the
officer with reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop the defend-
ant's vehicle for driving with a defective brake light. 2 7 After the
officer stopped Otey's vehicle based on one-half of the vehicle's
high mount brake light being out, the officer smelled marijua-
na. 22 When the officer asked about the smell, Otey admitted to
possessing marijuana.2 Prior to trial, Otey moved to suppress
the marijuana, arguing it was the fruit of an improper stop. 230
In order for a traffic stop to be considered reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, "the officer [must] possess[] at least articu-
lable and reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is in violation of a
statute or regulation governing the vehicle's equipment."231 The
pivotal issue in Otey's case was whether his brake light was "de-
223. Id. at 306, 315, 734 S.E.2d at 720, 725.
224. Id. at 306, 734 S.E.2d at 721.
225. Id. at 307, 734 S.E.2d at 721. The court declined to reach the Commonwealth's
argument that Knight abandoned any privacy interest in the backpack. See id. at 309-10,
734 S.E.2d at 722-23. Additionally, the court rejected the Commonwealth's argument that
the evidence should not have been suppressed, notwithstanding a Fourth Amendment vio-
lation. See id. at 313-15, 734 S.E.2d at 724-25.
226. Id. at 315, 734 S.E.2d at 725.
227. 61 Va. App. 346, 347-49, 735 S.E.2d 255, 256 (2012).
228. Id. at 347-48, 735 S.E.2d at 256.
229. Id. at 348, 735 S.E.2d at 256.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 348-49, 735 S.E.2d at 256 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663
(1979)).
88 [Vol. 48:63
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
fective" as that term is defined in Virginia Code section 46.2-
1003."' Applying its plain meaning, the court determined that
"defective" means "faulty, deficient."2 " As the court explained, "[a]
brake light that lights up by only half is faulty and deficient, just
as an engine that sputters and lurches is defective, even if it
works well enough to enable the driver to reach his destina-
tion."234 Based upon this reasoning, the court concluded that the
officer's stop of Otey's vehicle was "based on a reasonable, articu-
lable suspicion that appellant's vehicle had defective equip-
ment."
3. Miranda Rights
In Kuhne v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
considered whether the defendant's confession "should have been
excluded as the fruit of an illegal interrogation under Miranda v.
Arizona ... and Missouri v. Seibert."236 Kuhne entered a police
station and announced he "need[ed] to be arrested for [his] ac-
tions.""' Kuhne then began to weep and presented an unsigned
note.3 The note took responsibility for the death of a woman.239
After officers escorted Kuhne to an interview room, another of-
ficer interviewed Kuhne. 240 Near the beginning of the interview,
the officer asked Kuhne if he wrote the note.241 After Kuhne
acknowledged he did, the officer read Kuhne his Miranda
rights.242 Kuhne waived his Fifth Amendment rights and con-
fessed to killing his wife.243
232. Id. at 349, 735 S.E.2d at 257 (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 46.2-
1003 states that "[ilt shall be unlawful for any person to use or have as equipment on a
motor vehicle operated on a highway any device or equipment mentioned in § 46.2-1002
which is defective or in unsafe condition." VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1003 (Repl. Vol. 2010 &
Cum. Supp. 2013) (emphasis added).
233. Otey, 61 Va. App. at 350, 735 S.E.2d at 257 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 591 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 352, 735 S.E.2d at 258.
236. 61 Va. App. 79, 82, 733 S.E.2d 667, 668 (2012) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966); Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004)).
237. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
238. Id. at 82-33, 733 S.E.2d at 668-69.
239. Id. at 83, 733 S.E.2d at 669.
240. Id. at 83-84, 733 S.E.2d at 669.
241. Id. at 84, 733 S.E.2d at 669.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 84-85, 733 S.E.2d at 669-70.
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Prior to trial, Kuhne moved to suppress his confession, "argu-
ing that it was obtained in violation of his Miranda rights."244 The
trial court denied the motion, finding that Kuhne was not in cus-
tody for Miranda purposes, and even if he was, the actions of the
police did not implicate Seibert.245 On appeal, the court of appeals
assumed Kuhne was in custody and should have been issued Mi-
randa warnings at the outset of the interrogation. 246 The disposi-
tive issue for the court of appeals was whether the statements
Kuhne made after Miranda warnings were admissible under
Seibert.2 47 In order to resolve this issue, the court first had to de-
248termine the scope of the Seibert decision.
Seibert involved a deliberate "question first" or "two step" in-
terrogation technique, where police would purposefully withhold
Miranda warnings, obtain a confession, and then provide the
suspect with full warnings and get him to reconfess. 249 "Although
five Justices concluded that the suspect's second statement could
not be admitted as evidence, no single opinion spoke for the
Court."250 In Kuhne, the court of appeals explained that "Justice
Kennedy's opinion would apply a form of heightened scrutiny only
to those two-step cases in which law enforcement officers deliber-
ately employed a two-step procedure designed to weaken Miran-
da's protections."251 Joining a majority of federal252 and state25
courts, the court found that Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion
represented the holding in Seibert.254
The court held that "unless police deliberately employ the
'question first' strategy, the admissibility of postwarning state-
244. Id. at 85, 733 S.E.2d at 670.
245. Id. at 86, 733 S.E.2d at 670 (citing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004)).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 90, 733 S.E.2d at 672.
249. See id. at 88, 733 S.E.2d at 671 (citing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 609-10
(2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 91, 733 S.E.2d at 673 (citing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 621-22
(2004)) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
252. Id. at 90 n.5, 733 S.E.2d at 672 n.5.
253. Id. at 90 n.6, 733 S.E.2d at 672 n.6.
254. Id. at 91, 733 S.E.2d at 673. ("Mhe holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds." (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted))).
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ments is governed by Elstad.""' Under Elstad, "The relevant in-
quiry is whether, in fact, the second statement was also voluntar-
ily made."256 Applying Elstad, the court of appeals found that the
statement Kuhne made after Miranda was clearly voluntary.2 "
4. Brady Material
In Commonwealth v. Tuma, the Supreme Court of Virginia
wrestled with whether the Commonwealth violated the due pro-
cess protections of Brady v. Maryland "by suppressing evidence in
the form of an audio tape recording of an investigative interview
with the victim.""' The victim, a seven-year-old girl, claimed she
was sexually assaulted by Tuma, her stepfather.2 59 A police inves-
tigator and a child protective services worker with the Depart-
ment of Social Services ("DSS") interviewed the victim. 260 As re-
quired by DSS regulations, the child protective services worker
recorded the interview.261 A written summary of the interview,
but not the recording, was disclosed to defense counsel prior to
*262trial.
At trial, after the child protective services worker confirmed
that she recorded the interview and had the audio tape with her
in the court room, Tuma's counsel moved to admit the entire tape
into evidence.263 Since none of the parties nor the trial judge had
listened to the tape, the trial judge refused to admit it into evi-
dence. 264 The trial judge nonetheless told defense counsel that he
255. Id. In Oregon v. Elstad, the Supreme Court of the United States concluded that
"[a] subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect ... ordinarily should
suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement." 470
U.S. 298, 314 (1985).
256. Kuhne, 61 Va. App. at 93, 733 S.E.2d at 674 (alteration in original) (quoting El-
stad, 470 U.S. at 318) (internal quotation marks omitted).
257. Id.
258. 285 Va. 629, 631-32, 740 S.E.2d 14, 16 (2013) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963)).




263. Id. at 632-33, 740 S.E.2d at 16.
264. Id. at 633, 740 S.E.2d at 16.
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could listen to the tape. 26 5 Defense counsel, however, never asked
to listen to the tape outside of the jury's presence."'
In considering whether a Brady violation occurred, the su-
preme court observed that "Brady is not violated, as a matter of
law, when impeachment evidence is made available to [a] defend-
ant[ during trial if the defendant has sufficient time to make use
of [it] at trial."267 The court concluded that "Tuma failed, as a mat-
ter of law, to show he was denied access to the tape recording in
sufficient time to effectively use it at trial.""' Upon learning about
the tape, defense counsel could have asked for a recess and lis-
tened to it, but chose not to do So."'
B. Specific Crimes
1. Contempt
In Amos v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
considered whether the defendant, who was held in summary
contempt, preserved her arguments for appeal, and whether the
trial court erred in exercising its power of summary contempt.27
The case arose after Mrs. Amos made allegations that her es-
tranged husband violated the restraining order she had previous-
ly obtained."' In a letter to the Commonwealth's Attorney for Ar-
lington County, Mrs. Amos alleged that "during a custody
exchange of their son at a McDonald's restaurant, Mr. Amos en-
gaged in actions designed 'to intimidate, harass and threaten'
her."272 Based upon these allegations, "the court issued a rule to
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 635, 740 S.E.2d at 18 (alteration in original) (quoting Read v. Va. State Bar,
233 Va. 560, 564-65, 357 S.E.2d 544, 546-47 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
268. Id. at 637, 740 S.E.2d at 19.
269. Id. In his concurrence, Justice Lemons explained that he would further hold that
the statements at issue were not material. Id. at 642, 740 S.E.2d at 22 (Lemons, J., con-
curring). Two dissenting Justices would have found all the requirements of a Brady viola-
tion. Id. at 643, 740 S.E.2d at 22 (Millette, J., dissenting).
270. 61 Va. App. 730, 733, 740 S.E.2d 43, 45 (2013), appeal granted, No. 130757 (Va.
Sept. 24, 2013).
271. Id. at 733-34, 740 S.E.2d at 45.
272. Id., 740 S.E.2d at 45.
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show cause to determine whether Mr. Amos had violated the
terms of his probation."273
At the hearing, Mrs. Amos testified that, during the exchange
at the McDonald's, her husband insulted her and made threats
against her.274 An eyewitness, however, testified that once Mrs.
Amos arrived, there was no communication between her and Mr.
Amos.2 75 Mr. Amos's tape-recording of the exchange was also con-
sistent with this account and inconsistent with Mrs. Amos's tes-
timony.' At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court chas-
tised Mrs. Amos for lying and for her vindictiveness toward her
husband.277 After holding her in contempt, the trial court ordered
the sheriffs deputy to remove Mrs. Amos from the courtroom and
278directed the clerk to call the next case.
The Court of Appeals of Virginia, sitting en banc, first held that
by operation of Virginia Code section 8.01-384(A), Mrs. Amos did
not have an opportunity to object at the time of the ruling or or-
der and, therefore, the arguments she made on appeal were not
procedurally defaulted under Rule 5A:18.279 Second, the court
found that "[t]he truth or falsity of Mrs. Amos's testimony and
whether she was a victim or a vindictive person 'depend[ed] upon
statements made by others."'80 Therefore, the court of appeals
found that summary contempt was not available and reversed the
judgment of the trial court holding Mrs. Amos in summary con-
2811tempt.
273. Id. at 734, 740 S.E.2d at 45.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 734-35, 740 S.E.2d at 45.
277. Id. at 735, 740 S.E.2d at 46.
278. Id. at 736, 740 S.E.2d at 46.
279. Id. at 733, 736, 740 S.E.2d at 45-46 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-384(A) (Repl.
Vol. 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2013)). Five judges dissented on this ground. Id. at 743-52, 740
S.E.2d at 50-54 (Felton, J., dissenting).
280. Id. at 743, 740 S.E.2d at 50 (second alteration in original) (quoting In re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257, 275 (1948)).
281. Id. In contrast to Amos, the court of appeals held in Parham v. Commonwealth
that the defendant could be held in summary contempt when she "balled up" a summons
in front of the trial court. 60 Va. App. 450, 459-60, 729 S.E.2d 734, 738 (2012).
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2. Embezzlement
Leftwich v. Commonwealth involved an attorney's embezzle-
ment of funds from her law firm.282 Leftwich's law practice focused
on social security disability law.2" Her employment agreement
with the firm "stated that all legal fees or similar forms of com-
pensation earned by [her] in the capacity of her employment were
the exclusive property of [the firm]."" In order to compensate
Leftwich for her representation of social security claimants, "the
United States Department of the Treasury mailed checks payable
to her (and not the firm) at the firm's business address.""' During
the summer of 2010, "the law firm became aware of a discrepancy
in its accounting records."28 6 Upon further investigation, the firm's
records indicated that social security disability checks received by
Leftwich had not been deposited into the firm's account. 287 Left-
wich eventually confessed to taking the money, which she claimed
amounted to approximately $50,000."' However, "[a] subsequent
investigation by the firm revealed the amount to be nearly half a
million dollars."8
Virginia's embezzlement statute "provides three separate and
distinct scenarios in which a person may be convicted of embez-
zlement: when a person misappropriates property 1) 'received for
another or for [her] employer' or 2) 'by virtue of [her] office, trust,
or employment' or 3) 'which shall have been entrusted or deliv-
ered to [her] by another."'9 o The thrust of Leftwich's argument on
appeal was that "the Social Security Administration did not en-
trust the checks to her for the benefit of the firm."291 The Court of
Appeals of Virginia held that her argument failed because it ig-
nored the first part of the embezzlement statute.2 92 The evidence
showed that Leftwich "wrongfully and fraudulently used or dis-
282. 61 Va. App. 422, 424, 737 S.E.2d 42, 43 (2013).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 424-25, 737 S.E.2d at 43-44.




290. Id. at 428, 737 S.E.2d at 45 (alteration in original) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
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posed of the firm's property (checks)" that she received on behalf
of the firm."' The court of appeals held "[t]hat evidence, in itself,
[was] sufficient for a conviction."294
3. Felony Murder
The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed a felony murder con-
viction in Woodard v. Commonwealth."' At approximately 7:00
p.m., Woodard sold the victim ecstasy pills." 6 Later that evening
at an apartment, the victim took the pills and eventually died
from taking a lethal dose of ecstasy.297 At the conclusion of
Woodard's trial, the trial court ruled that "there was a sufficient
'causal connection' and 'temporal connection' between the sale of
the ecstasy and [the victim]'s killing to constitute felony mur-
der."298
In order to convict a defendant of felony murder under Virginia
law, "the killing must be committed 'while in the prosecution' of
the underlying offense, or as it is often said, within the res gestae
of the underlying offense."299 The killing must be "so closely relat-
ed to the felony in time, place, and causal connection as to make
it a part of the same criminal enterprise."00 Woodard argued on
appeal "that the underlying felony, the sale of ecstasy, was com-
pleted before the homicide, and therefore, the homicide did not
occur within the res gestae of the predicate offense."o' The court of
appeals agreed, finding "two of the felony-murder rule elements
were missing: time and place."302 The time element was not estab-
lished because the killing occurred over two hours after the sale
of ecstasy.os And the place element was not established because
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. 61 Va. App. 567, 569, 739 S.E.2d 220, 221 (2013), appeal granted, No. 130854 (Va.
Sept. 12, 2013).
296. Id.
297. Id. at 570-71, 739 S.E.2d at 221.
298. Id. at 571, 739 S.E.2d at 221-22.
299. Id. at 572, 739 S.E.2d at 222.
300. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Montague, 260 Va. 697, 701, 536 S.E.2d 910, 913
(2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
301. Id. 569, 739 S.E.2d at 221.
302. Id. at 569, 572, 739 S.E.2d at 221-22.
303. Id. at 573, 739 S.E.2d at 223.
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the underlying felony took place in the store parking lot, and not
the apartment where the pills were taken.3 0 4
4. Firearm Offenses
The Virginia courts decided a number of significant cases in-
volving firearms. In Baker v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court
of Virginia grappled with "whether evidence of the possession of
one firearm on three separate occasions can constitute three sep-
arate charges for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon."05
The firearm in question was first stolen by Baker and displayed
to his friend on the same day.306 Several weeks later, Baker at-
tempted to sell the firearm to another individual.3 o' The following
day, Baker sold the firearm to that individual during a controlled
exchange setup by the police.30 ' Based on these three incidents,
Baker was convicted of three counts of possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon in violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-
308.2(A).
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, Baker argued he
should have been charged with one continuous possession of a
firearm.3 "o Finding Virginia Code section 18.2-308.2(A) ambiguous
as to when one offense ends and the next begins, the supreme
court looked to the "gravamen of the offense to determine the leg-
islature's intent."3 1' The court pointed out that the language of the
statute includes specific prohibitions against transporting a fire-
arm.312 The court found that the "inclusion of these specific refer-
ences expresses the General Assembly's intent that separate in-
stances of possession, and therefore of heightened danger to the
304. Id. at 573-74, 739 S.E.2d at 223. In a case decided the same day as Woodard, the
court of appeals affirmed a defendant's felony murder conviction when his drunk driving
was "inextricably linked and integral to the victim's death." See Montano v. Common-
wealth, 61 Va. App. 610, 617, 739 S.E.2d 241, 244 (2013).
305. 284 Va. 572, 574, 733 S.E.2d 642, 643 (2012).
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 574-75, 733 S.E.2d at 643.
309. Id. at 575, 733 S.E.2d at 643-44 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.2(A) (Repl. Vol.
2009)).
310. Id., 733 S.E.2d at 644.
311. Id. at 576, 733 S.E.2d at 644-45.
312. Id. at 577, 733 S.E.2d at 645 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.2(A) (Repl. Vol.
2009)).
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community, be punished separately.""' The court reasoned that
"[i]f the statute was meant to restrict the offense only to the re-
ceipt, initial possession, or even extended possession of the weap-
on, such a specific reference to the transporting or carrying of
that weapon would be a frivolous and unnecessary addition to the
statutory language."' Thus, the supreme court held that addi-
tional counts of possession of firearm by a convicted felon can be
established with each separate act or occurrence that can be
proven by the government.
The sole issue considered by the Court of Appeals of Virginia in
Doulgerakis v. Commonwealth was "whether a firearm in an un-
locked, but latched, glove box of a private vehicle is 'secured in a
container or compartment' within the meaning of Code § 18.2-
308(B)(10)," Virginia's concealed weapon statute. 316 During a traf-
fic stop, a police officer asked Doulgerakis "if he had anything in
his glove box to cause him concern.""31 Doulgerakis stated that
there was a handgun in the glove compartment.'1 Since the
glovebox was closed but unlocked during the traffic stop, the
Commonwealth argued that the firearm was not "secured" within
the meaning of the concealed weapon statute because it was read-
ily accessible for the defendant's prompt and immediate use.
The trial court agreed and convicted Doulgerakis of possession of
a concealed weapon.32
Virginia Code section 18.2-308(C)(10) creates an exception to
the concealed weapon prohibition for any person carrying a hand-
gun while in a personal, private vehicle, when "such handgun is
secured in a container or compartment in the vehicle."32' The
court of appeals agreed with the Commonwealth's concession on
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 578, 733 S.E.2d at 645. The dissent would have applied the rule of lenity
and construed the statute in the defendant's favor. Id. at 579, 733 S.E.2d at 646 (Powell,
J., dissenting).
316. 61 Va. App. 417, 419, 737 S.E.2d 40, 41 (2013). The 2013 General Assembly
amended Virginia Code section 18.2-308(B)(10) to section 18.2-308(C)(10). Act of Apr. 3,
2013, ch. 746, 2013 Va. Acts _,_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
308(C)(10) (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
317. Id. at 418, 737 S.E.2d at 41.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 419, 737 S.E.2d at 41 (internal quotation marks omitted).
320. Id. at 418-19, 737 S.E.2d at 40-41.
321. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308(C)(10) (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
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appeal that a handgun need not be in a locked glove compartment
to be exempt from the statute.32 2 Interpreting the legislative his-
tory of the exception, the court determined that the legislature
made clear that "secured" does not mean "locked" when it adopted
the Governor's recommendation in 2010 to replace the word
"locked" with "secured."323 The court went on to define "secured"
as "in safekeeping or custody" or "well-fastened.""' Applying this
definition, the court of appeals found Doulgerakis's handgun in
compliance with the exception to the concealed weapon statute
since it was in a closed, latched and "well-fastened" glove com-
325partment.
In Smith v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
addressed use of a firearm in the commission of a burglary.3 2 6 Two
years ago in Rowland v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of
Virginia reversed a conviction for use of a firearm in the commis-
sion of a burglary.3 ' There, Rowland entered a restaurant at
night, walked into the kitchen, pointed a firearm at an employee,
and demanded money from the cash register."' The supreme
court concluded that the elements of statutory burglary were
complete before Rowland used or displayed a firearm.32 9
Relying on Rowland, Smith argued the burglary was complete
before he used or displayed the gun and, thus, that the evidence
failed to support his conviction for using a firearm in the commis-
sion of burglary.3 o The court of appeals disagreed and distin-
guished Rowland on its facts."' In Smith's case, the victim saw
Smith and his companions enter without invitation.' As soon as
Smith entered, the victim noticed he was holding a firearm "down
at his side.""' The court held that "the way [Smith] used the gun
322. Doulgerakis, 61 Va. App. at 419, 737 S.E.2d at 41.
323. Id. at 420-21, 737 S.E.2d at 42 (internal quotation marks omitted).
324. Id. at 422, 737 S.E.2d at 42 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing WEBSTER'S
NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1641 (2d ed. 1983); THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY 1109 (2d College ed. 1982)).
325. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
326. 61 Va. App. 690, 692, 739 S.E.2d 280, 281 (2013).
327. 281 Va. 396, 402, 707 S.E.2d 331, 334 (2011).
328. Id. at 398, 707 S.E.2d at 332.
329. Id. at 402, 707 S.E.2d at 334.
330. Smith, 61 Va. App. at 693, 739 S.E.2d at 281.
331. Id. at 694, 739 S.E.2d at 282.
332. Id.
333. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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after entering supports the jury's finding, implicit in its verdict,
that he used the gun during the entry for the same purpose, in
order to be ready to subdue [the victim] as necessary."334
5. Indecent Exposure
The charges in Barnes v. Commonwealth stemmed from an in-
cident in which Barnes, while in his jail cell, masturbated in front
of a visiting female pretrial services employee."' Barnes was
charged with indecent exposure and sexual display under Virgin-
ia Code sections 18.2-387 and 18.2-387.1.336 Both statutes have a
"public place" component.' Barnes argued that the evidence was
insufficient to support his convictions because he was not "in pub-
lic" or "in any public place" at the time of the alleged offenses, and
that the jail was essentially his home.
The Court of Appeals of Virginia held that "public place," as
used in Virginia Code sections 18.2-387 and 18.2-387.1, "compris-
es places and circumstances where the offender does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy, because of the foreseeability of
a non-consenting public witness."3 When standing at the front of
his cell in first floor lockup, Barnes "was in open view to staff,
other inmates, and to members of the public with authorized ac-
cess."34' Therefore, the court held that Barnes "did not have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy and the facts were sufficient to
support the finding that his behavior occurred in a public
place."34
334. Id.
335. 61 Va. App. 495, 496-97, 737 S.E.2d 919, 920 (2013).
336. Id. at 496-97, 737 S.E.2d at 920.
337. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-387 (Repl. Vol. 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2013) ("Every person
who intentionally makes an obscene display or exposure of his person ... in any public
place ... shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor."); id. § 18.2-387.1 (Repl. Vol. 2009 &
Cum. Supp. 2013) ("Any person who, while in any public place ... engages in actual or ex-
plicitly simulated acts of masturbation, is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.").
338. Barnes, 61 Va. App. at 497, 737 S.E.2d at 920.
339. Id. at 500. 737 S.E.2d at 921.
340. Id., 737 S.E.2d at 922.
341. Id.
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IV. LEGISLATION
A. Actual Innocence
The 2013 Virginia General Assembly made two significant
changes to the actual innocence statutes. First, the actual inno-
cence statutes were amended to allow juveniles, adjudicated de-
linquent by a circuit court of an offense that would be a felony if
committed by an adult, to petition for a writ of actual innocence
under the same circumstances as an adult seeking relief from a
felony conviction.342 Second, the petitioner's burden of proof in ac-
tual innocence cases was changed from "no rational trier of fact
could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" to "no
rational trier of fact would have found proof of guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt."43 In an actual innocence proceeding, the Court of
Appeals of Virginia or Supreme Court of Virginia is the fact find-
er,344 so the change recognizes that the relevant inquiry in actual
innocence is not appellate review of the sufficiency of the trial ev-
idence, but the impact of the new evidence for the court with orig-
inal jurisdiction.3 45
B. Appeals of Bail Decisions
The 2013 Virginia General Assembly also refined the process
for appealing a bail decision. A court granting or denying bail, or-
dering any increase in the amount of a bond, ordering new or ad-
ditional sureties, or revoking such bail may, upon appeal and
with a showing of good cause, stay execution of such order for so
long as reasonably practicable for the party to obtain an expedit-
ed hearing before the next higher court."' However, no stay may
342. Act of Mar. 12, 2013, ch. 170, 2013 Va. Acts _, _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-327. to -327.3, -327.5, -327.10 to -327.13 (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
343. Act of Mar. 12, 2013, ch. 180, 2013 Va. Acts _, _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-327.3, -327.5, -327.11, -327.13 (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
344. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-327.2, -327.10 (Cum. Supp. 2013); see also Haynes-
worth v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 197, 215, 717 S.E.2d 817, 826 (2011) (Humphreys,
J., dissenting) (discussing jurisdiction in actual innocence cases).
345. See ch. 180, 2013 Va. Acts at _; see also Haynesworth, 59 Va. App. at 223, 717
S.E.2d at 830 (Humphreys, J., dissenting) (discussing the demanding standard for actual
innocence cases).
346. Act of Mar. 16, 2013, ch. 408, 2013 Va. Acts ,__ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-124, -132 (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
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be granted after any person who has been granted bail has been
released from custody on such bail.'
C. Consecutive Sentences for Certain Crimes
In a pair of cases recently decided by the Supreme Court of
Virginia and Court of Appeals of Virginia, the courts held a trial
court has discretion to sentence a defendant to concurrent man-
datory minimum sentences.' Shortly thereafter, the General As-
sembly introduced a bill that would have required all individuals
convicted under mandatory minimum sentences to serve that
time consecutively with any other sentence.' However, the bill
did not pass in that form.' Instead, the adopted legislation re-
quires only certain crimes with mandatory minimum sentences to
be served consecutively with any other sentence."
D. Erroneously Admitted Evidence on Appeal
In Rushing v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that erroneously admitted evidence could not be considered
in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence and, if the remaining
record is not sufficient to support the conviction, the appellate
court must reverse and enter final judgment.3 52 In response to
Rushing, the 2013 Virginia General Assembly created Virginia
Code section 19.2-324.1."' From now on, in appeals to the court of
appeals or supreme court, "when a challenge to a conviction rests
on a claim that the evidence was insufficient because the trial
347. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-124 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
348. See supra Part II(B)(1).
349. H.B. 2269, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2013).
350. Act of Apr. 3, 2013, ch. 761, 2013 Va. Acts _, _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-253.2, 18.2-46.3:3, 18.2-60.4, 18.2-61, 18.2-67.1, 18.2-67.2, 18.2-154,
18.2-308.2:2, 18.2-374.1, 18.2-374.1:1 (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
351. The crimes are found in Virginia Code sections 16.1-253.2 (violation of protective
orders), 18.2-46.3:3 (gang activity in gang-free zones), 18.2-60.4 (violation of protective or-
ders), 18.2-61 (rape), 18.2-67.1 (forcible sodomy), 18.2-67.2 (object sexual penetration),
18.2-154 (shooting or throwing missiles at law-enforcement or emergency vehicles), 18.2-
308.2:2 (purchasing firearm with intent to resell or provide to a person ineligible to pur-
chase or receive a firearm or soliciting employing, or assisting such a purchase), 18.2-374.1
(production of child pornography), and 18.2-374.1:1 (possession or distribution of child
pornography). Id.
352. 284 Va. 270, 279-80, 726 S.E.2d 333, 338-39 (2012).
353. Act of Mar. 21, 2013, ch. 675, 2013 Va. Acts , (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
19.2-324.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
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court improperly admitted evidence, the reviewing court shall
consider all evidence admitted at trial to determine whether
there is sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction."" Addition-
ally, "[i]f the reviewing court determines that evidence was erro-
neously admitted and that such error was not harmless, the case
shall be remanded for a new trial if the Commonwealth elects to
have a new trial." 55
E. Texting While Driving
Texting while driving was elevated from a secondary offense-
one that can only be charged when the offender is stopped for an-
other, separate offense-to a primary offense.356 Texting while
driving "is a traffic infraction punishable, for a first offense, by a
fine of $125 and, for a second or subsequent offense, by a fine of
$250."'
354. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-324.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
355. Id.
356. Act of Apr. 3, 2013, ch. 752, 2013 Va. Acts , (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 46.2-868, -1078.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
357. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1078.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
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